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CHANGING THE PREMISE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REMEDIES: 
THE UNFOUNDED ADOPTION OF 
ASSURANCES AND GUARANTEES 
OF NON-REPETITION 
Scott M. Sullivan* 
Marbury v. Madison forever changed the way legal academics 
and practitioners viewed the powers of the U.S. federal judiciary. The 
International Court of Justice (!CJ), in its recent LaGrand decision, 
has challenged other international institutions as well as individual 
nations through a Marbury-esque unilateral declaration it hopes will 
similarly affect its power and efficacy in the context of international 
law and relations with states. 
This article examines the rise and ultimate !CJ acceptance of 
assurances and guarantees of non-repetition as a fundamental shift 
from well-established remedial norms of restitution and repair to a 
paradigm of prospective relief How does this change affect current 
notions of proper international action within the domestic realm? 
Further, what effects will this shift have on state action and legal 
legitimacy? 
After thorough analysis, the article contends that the unfounded 
acceptance of this new prospective relief taints both international in­
stitutions and legal principles. The presence of this taint-coupled 
with the serious legal and political implications of the implementation 
of this potentially harsh prospective remedy-impedes rather than fa­
cilitates the progression and efficacy of international law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In June 2001, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) announced a deci­
sion that prompted an international public discussion because of its bearing 
on America's use of the death penalty, the merit of provisional measures, and 
the latent tension between two allied world powers. The state of Arizona's 
execution of a German national despite the frantic cries of his government 
and the gentle prodding of federal officials merged the politically-charged 
debate on capital punishment into a full frontal assault on consular relations 
generally, and the efficacy of the International Court of Justice specifically. 
The Court responded to this perceived assault in its LaGrand (Germany v. 
United States) judgment of June 2001 . 1  Newspaper headlines proclaimed that 
the Court's judgment elevated the level of respect for international law and 
1 LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), I.CJ. (June 27, 2001), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/ 
icjwww/idocket/igus/igusjudgment/igus_ijudgment_200l0625.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2003). 
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represented world condemnation of the American death penalty.2 Undoubt­
edly, the debate stirred by La.Grand on these issues will continue and public 
intellectuals and legal academics will scrupulously examine the Court's judg­
ment. 3 However, the most revolutionary consequence of La.Grand is its dras­
tic implication for remedial powers of courts applying international law-an 
implication at which the world media has not raised an eyebrow. 
International law is based on the creation of obligations among states, 
but does not traditionally address how such obligations should be met and 
administered on a national level, within domestic laws.4 The introduction of 
assurances and guarantees of non-repetition (AGNRs) as a tool of interna­
tional courts not only infuses international law with the ability to directly 
instruct effects within national law, but vests this profound power in judicial 
institutions unsuited for the task. 
The La.Grand judgment changes the dynamic of international law in a 
manner similar to the way the United States Supreme Court delineated its 
power to strike down federal legislation in Marbury v. Madison:5 quietly and 
surreptitiously. In LaGrand, the ICJ embraces a new legal remedy, court­
issued AGNRs, without examining their legal basis or providing guidance for 
application. Moreover, LaGrand duplicates Marbury's tactics by declining 
to exercise the new remedy in a way that would trigger vigorous state protest. 
This article argues that AGNRs do not fit the mainstream conception of 
customary international law, nor are they valid under more expansive theo­
ries. Through interdependent reasoning and process, the ICJ and the Interna­
tional Law Commission (ILC) joined forces to create new law that neglects 
both the principles of customary international law and the practicality and 
theory of state compliance. This formation leaves AGNRs with no legitimate 
legal foundation and extends the power base of international law-tradition­
ally limited to the remedial restoration of harms-into the active anticipation 
and prevention of future violations. Further, the artificial elevation of 
2 See Peter Finn, World Court Rebukes U.S. Over Execution of Germans, WASH. PosT, June 28, 
2001, at A20; Imre Karacs, U.S. Found Guilty of Flouting Law on Death Penalty Laws, THE INDE­
PENDENT (LONDON), June 28, 2001, at 16; Press Release, Amnesty International, The USA Must 
Obey International Court Decision on Prisoners' Rights (June 28, 2001) (on file with author). 
3 This is especially true in the relationship to the binding nature of provisional measures, a widely 
debated issue in legal academia. In contrast, due to U.S. federalism and unwillingness to sign 
human rights treaties, the issue of condemnation of the death penalty is more likely to elicit interest 
among non-lawyers rather than mark a new era of jurisprudence in the area of capital punishment. 
4 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common 
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REv. 815, 819 (1997); see generally Loms 
HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAw: CAsEs and MATERIAL 153 (3d ed. 1993). 
5 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
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AGNRs undermines the ICJ's and ILC's legitimacy, fracturing the backbone 
upon which the international legal system relies for compliance. This harm 
is accentuated by the bodies' insufficient guidance on the application of 
AGNRs, resulting in impossibly large applicability and no evidence of reme­
dial efficiency. 
Section I of this article examines the significance of AGNRs in their 
historical context and the recent ICJ judgment in LaGrand. It explains the 
meaning of AGNRs both historically and under the new legal framework 
established by the ILC and ICJ, respectively. Additionally, it discusses both 
theoretical and practical applications of these meanings. 
Section II analyzes the artificial elevation of AGNRs from a discrete 
diplomatic practice to a potentially large-scale remedy wielded by interna­
tional courts. It demonstrates the court-ordered AGNRs' unsubstantiated re­
liance on the foundation of "progressive development," insufficient historical 
precedent, and inappropriate ties to the cessation of present harms. 
Section III critiques the new prominence of AGNRs and illustrates how 
the ILC and ICJ stood on each other's shoulders in advocating a legal remedy 
unsupported by law. 
Finally, Section IV addresses the multiple problems created by the ICJ's 
adoption of AGNRs. First, there are practical problems relating to the broad 
language used by the court, which may result in indeterminacy and boundless 
application. This underscores the Court's failure to clearly articulate the use 
of AGNRs in a given pattern of facts, including those of LaGrand. Further, 
Section IV examines how the Court's decision in LaGrand compromises the 
legal principle of AGNRs, the institutional integrity of the ICJ, and compli­
ance with international law generally. 
I. THE HISTORY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ASSURANCES AND GUARANTEES 
OF NoN-REPETITION (AGNRs) 
The practice of diplomatic AGNRs has been present in the world of 
international relations since the 19th century and continues to the present 
day. Diplomatically, the practice is straightforward. One nation notifies an­
other that it believes a current practice violates a tenet of international law. 
In addition to the cessation of that violation, if it is a continuing one, the non­
infringing state would ask the infringing state for a promise that the activity 
will not happen again or for a specific action that would actively reduce the 
likelihood of another violation. For example, in 1901, in response to pres­
sure from Great Britain, the Ottoman Empire made a formal assurance that 
British postal services would be able to operate freely in its territory. During 
the Boer War (1899-1900), Germany requested Britain to issue instructions 
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to its Navy not to molest German merchant ships outside recognized war 
zones in accordance with the customary international law of prize. 6 Of these 
practices, the Ottoman assurance of free movement within its empire is akin 
to an "assurance of non-repetition" (ANR), while the issuance of instructions 
to the British navy by the government regarding policy toward German 
merchants would be considered a "guarantee of non-repetition" (GNR). 
More recently, in 1986 Afghanistan called for the issuance of AGNRs 
when it made a diplomatic request to the United States and "other imperialist 
powers" asking them to create a policy of non-intervention against the So­
viet-backed Afghani government. It stated, "The key to the solution is the 
total cessation of these interventions and the provision of international guar­
antees on their cessation and non-repetition.''7 
In 1997, Chechen nationalists, in peace negotiations with the Russian 
government, also asked for an AGNR when they insisted through diplomatic 
and public channels that for a cease-fire to be effective, Russia must agree to 
"a guarantee that there can be no repetition of the solution of controversial 
problems by force. "8 The Chechens characterized the conflict with Russia as 
a violation of international law and equated such a guarantee as the lynchpin 
for securing its independence.9 
In both the Afghanistan-U.S. and Chechnya-Russia incidents, the in­
fringing parties declined to adhere to the Afghani and Chechnyan requests, 
and thus no guarantees were issued.10 
Compared to assurances and guarantees issued in the course of diplo­
macy, court remedies bearing similarities to AGNRs are few. AGNRs are 
not remedies under customary international law because the primary goal of 
international dispute resolution is to remedy past wrongs and/or enjoin cur­
rent wrongs. In addition, as opposed to a diplomatic assurance or guarantee, 
a court ordered AGNR would impose a new legal obligation upon the in­
fringing state. The AGNR would require new action that, if not complied 
with, would give rise to new legal consequences unrelated to the satisfaction 
of the original obligation. The new obligation thus burdens not only the in­
fringing state, but also the court that issued the AGNR. 
6 See C. JoHN CoLOMBos, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIZE, §6, at 7, §§151-154, at 164-67 
(1926). 
7 Kabul Press Coriference on Partial Withdrawal of Soviet Forces from DRA, BBC SUMMARY of 
WoRLD BROADCASTS, Oct. 22, 1986. 
8 Top Official Interviewed on Chechen Peace Prospects, First Use of Nuclear Arms, BBC SUM­
MARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, May 12, 1997. 
9 Id. 
io Id. 
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The Trail Smelter case is one of the few examples of the use of mea­
sures similar to AGNRs by an international legal tribunal, although it focuses 
on a past wrong as opposed to preventive judicial action.11 In the case, the 
United States complained that a Canadian mining and smelting company just 
north of the U.S. border was polluting the Columbia River valley through 
suJfur dioxide emissions.12 The U.S. and Canada engaged in legal arbitration 
that resulted in a finding for the U.S. that required Canada to pay compensa­
tion. Additionally, the tpbunal mandated that the smelting company must 
maintain equipment to measure environmental conditions, including sulfur 
dioxide concentration, in areas where the U.S. claimed the pollution was oc­
curring.13 The measures were designed to reduce emissions to a level equal 
to or below guidelines set by the tribunal. Equipment readings and resulting 
pollution information were ordered to be given to both nations' governments 
on a monthly basis and, if levels rose above set guidelines, compensation 
could again be awarded to the United States.14 
In its codification efforts of state responsibility the ILC defines assur­
ances of non-repetition (ANRs) as generally verbal in nature and consisting 
of a state's assertion that it will not engage in the prohibited activity in the 
future.15 In comparison, guarantees of non-repetition (GNRs) offer a more 
substantial commitment and demand more tangible action that manifests in a 
change of policy or law, rather than mere verbal assurances. For example, 
the infringing state may be forced to commit to preventive measures re­
quested by the injured state calculated to reduce the likelihood of a repeat 
breach.16 In relationship to the application and role of AGNRs, the ILC 
notes that when such a remedy is sought, the primary concern is the "contin­
uation and repair of the legal relationship affected by the breach."17 As a 
result, the administering court's concern is the future impact of the order in 
light of this goal. 
When such a remedy is requested by the injured state, it comes in the 
form of a request that the violating state implement safeguards or remove 
obstacles in the way of attaining compliance. The goal of repairing the legal 
relationship is inextricably tied to the inherent concern of repetition. Given 
the relationship between the nations, the AGNR may run the spectrum of 
11 Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1911 (1938). 
12 Id. at 1922. 
13 Id. at 1918-19, 1924-33. 
14 Id. at 1934-36. 
15 Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 22 I. 
U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001)  [hereinafter ILC Commentary on State Responsibility]. 
16 Id. at 162. 
11 Id. at 216. 
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simple verbal assurances to very specific instructions or requirements of con­
duct. In the case of ANRs, simple promises of better protection for persons 
and property may be sufficient when foreign nationals are concerned. 18 
In 2001, the ICJ's adoption of the ILC's interpretation expanded AGNR 
use from diplomacy to international courts. As a result, a tool of diplomacy 
used to cajole and threaten other states into compliance was transformed into 
a legal instrument capable of creating additional binding obligations on states 
against their consent. 
II. THE ARTIFICIAL ELEV A TION OF ASSURANCES AND 
GUARANTEES OF NON-REPETITION 
The transformation of AGNRs into legal tools lacks a proper founda­
tion. Instead, it relies on doctrinal bootstrapping created by the ILC and 
adopted by the ICJ. Two main developments are responsible for this trans­
formation: 1) the ILC undertaking of codification of State Responsibility, 
and 2) the implicit adoption of the ILC argument for AGNRs by the ICJ in 
LaGrand. Both events elevated the power of the ICJ, making it better situ­
ated to order remedies that overhaul the traditional structure of international 
responsibilities. This section examines the ILC codification work and ICJ 
judgment in LaGrand as they evolved separately, became intertwined, and 
played key roles in bootstrapping the power of legal remedies in customary 
international law. 
A. International Law Commission: Its Authority and the Codification of 
State Responsibility Doctrine 
The ILC derives its influential power over codification through its 
founding resolution passed by the 1947 General Assembly pursuant to Arti­
cle 13(l)(a) of the UN Charter. 19 Under the process of codification, the ILC 
claims as successes its work in the creation of the Law of the Sea Conven­
tions of 1958, the Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, the Conven­
tion on Consular Relations of 1963, the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties of 1969, and the Convention for the Protection of Diplomats of 
1973.20 Since 1973, the ILC continued its work with less effect. In the in-
18 See ILC Commentary on State Responsibility, supra note 15. 
19 This part of the UN Charter empowers the General Assembly to make recommendations pro­
moting international cooperation, progressive development of international law, and the codification 
of international law. Much of this language is essentially repeated in the statute creating the ILC. 
U.N. CHARTER art. 13, para. l (a). 
20 Gerhard Hafner, The International Law Commission and the Future Codification of Interna­
tional law, 2 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 671, 671 (1996). 
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terim, the Convention on the Representation of States and two conventions 
on State Succession took place with neither entering into force. 21 More re­
cently, the ILC prepared and adopted a Draft Code of Crimes against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind22 that was ultimately eclipsed by the frame­
work of the Rome Statute that formulated the International Criminal Court 
(ICC).23 
The statute creating the ILC also empowered it with the ability to pursue 
"progressive development" of international law.24 This schism of responsibil­
ity between codification and "progressive development" reflects the deep di­
vide between those who desired the ILC to be a neutral body, with the 
primary task of piecing together the current state of law, and those who re­
garded it as a more politically charged body working to push law forward to 
embrace emerging trends.25 Ultimately, the UN bridged the divide by nar­
rowing its definition of codification, while allowing the ILC to cast progres­
sive movements into "draft conventions" that reflect its perception of modem 
trends within the law.26 The Committee defined "codification" as "the more 
precise formulation and systemization of rules of international law in fields 
where there already has been extensive state practice, precedent and doc­
trine."27 They outlined "progressive development" as "the preparation of 
draft conventions on subjects which have not yet been regulated by interna­
tional l�w or in regard to which the law has not yet been sufficiently devel­
oped in the practice of States."28 Despite the attempt to delineate and thus 
separate the two areas of responsibility, legal commentators, as well as the 
21 Id. 
22 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the International 
I.aw Commission on Its Forty-eighth Session, U.N. GAOR, 5lst Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 9, U.N. 
Doc. A/5 1/10 ( 1996). 
2j Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 ( 1996) available 
at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute. 
24 G.A. Res. 1 5 1 ,  32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 45, at 214- 15, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977) (ILC 
formed for "the promotion of progressive development of international law and its codification"); 
Statute of the International Law Commission, G.A. Res. 174(Il), art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947). 
25 Report of the Committee on the Progressive Development of International Law and Its Codifi­
cation, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 2nd Sess., Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/AC.10/5 1 ( 1 947). See also 
Herbert W. Briggs, THE lNTERNATIONAL LAw CoMMisSION 129-41 ( 1 965). 
26 Rosemary Rayfuse, The Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind: 
Eating Disorders at the International Law Commission, 8 CRIM. L.F. 43, 79 ( 1 997). 
27 Statute of the International Law Commission, art. XVII, U.N. Doc. A/CN.414 (2002) available 
at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/statufra.htm. 
2s Id. at art. XV. 
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ILC itself, have gauged it too difficult to completely separate codification 
and "progressive development."29 
Despite continued protest among states about the mixing of "progressive 
development" of new law and codification of existing practice, the ILC' s 
conventional practice reveals that its goals have been mixed, with a substan­
tial portion of its codification efforts being guided by its view of "progressive 
development."30 Notably, ILC work under the auspices of the Code of 
Crimes against the codification-driven Peace and Security of Mankind also 
resulted in draft rules for an international criminal court inspired by progres­
sive development.31 
The UN General Assembly first declared elements of state responsibility 
as proper work for the ILC in 1949. In its first manifestation, the ILC ad­
dressed a narrow segment of state responsibility regarding injuries to 
aliens.32 This small-scale approach was ultimately rejected with the appoint­
ment of Roberto Ago as special rapporteur who directed a more comprehen­
sive set of work. Ago expanded the project to encompass a clarification of 
the underlying framework for state responsibility without any discussion of 
the substantive rules that would trigger its protocol. Ago believed the crea­
tion of the articles should adhere to a strict distinction between "the princi­
ples which govern the responsibility . . . for internationally wrongful acts" 
and "the task of defining rules that place [original] obligations on States, the 
violation of which may generate responsibility."33 In essence, the articles of 
state responsibility were designed to create a structure of norms to clarify 
when an internationally wrongful act has occurred and what the legal conse­
quences of that act may be. These norms culminate in the remedial structure 
to be applied, including satisfaction, reparations, and countermeasures. 
Part of the remedial structure created by the ILC focuses on the diplo­
matic use of AGNRs in resolving disputes. The state responsibility article 
dealing with AGNRs was the only new remedial structure, the very existence 
29 Report of the International law Commission to the General Assembly, [ 1 956) 2 Y.B. Int'l L. 
Comm'n 255, U.N. Doc. N3 159. 
30 State protest is evident in multiple documents solicited by the ILC in which governments out­
line comments and observances on ILC projects; see B. Graefrath, The International law Commis­
sion Tomorrow: Improving its Organization and Methods of Work, 85 AM. J. INT'L. L. 595 ( 1 991) 
(discussing the role of progressive development in the current codification effort). 
31 This type of progressive development work i s  necessary when creating new institutions like an 
international criminal court. James Crawford, The /LC Adopts a Statute for an International Crimi­
nal Court, 89 AM. J. INT'L. L. 404, 405 ( 1 995). 
32 U.N. CoomcATION of STATE REsPONSIBil.JTY (Maria Spinedi & Bruno Simma eds., 1 987). 
33 Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, [ 1 970] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 306, U.N. 
Doc. N80 1 0/REV. l .  
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of which in customary international law was questioned.34 Its inclusion as 
Article 30 of the ILC's  Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted in November of 2001,35 moved it 
from a distinct diplomatic practice into a proposed part of customary interna­
tional law.36 The wording is as follows: 
Article 30 
Cessation and non-repetition. 
The State responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an 
obligation: 
(a) To cease that act, if it is continuing; 
(b) To offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repeti­
tion, if circumstances so require.37 
B. The International Court of Justice: Limits of Power and its Decision 
in LaGrand 
The ICJ Statute empowers the Court to apply international conventions 
that establish rules of customary international law, general principles of law, 
treaties and the often criticized provision of writings of the "most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the deter­
mination of rules of law."38 Additionally, the Court is empowered to act as 
the international tribunal to resolve disputes when explicitly assigned that 
task by treaty. When deciding a case under a relevant treaty, the Court is 
empowered to consider both the remedies included in the treaty and those 
under general customary international law. While ICJ judgments are not 
granted binding status through doctrinal precedent, they are de facto binding 
because they prescribe the legal principles on which a case stands.39 Thus, if 
a similar case were to arise, it is likely that the ICJ would recognize the same 
principles and rule in a similar manner. The ruling would be further facili-
34 See State Responsibility: Comments and Observations Received from Governments, Interna­
tional Law Commission, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/488 (1998). 
35 The article including AGNRs was included in previous drafts by the ILC and was actually 
argued as part of a different draft in the LaGrand case. The ILC had substantial discussions related 
to the placement of AGNRs in the Draft Articles, and, most significantly, whether it should be 
coupled with cessation or not. Comments Received by Governments, International Law Commis­
sion, 53d Sess., at 36, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/515 (2001). 
36 Christian J. Tams, Consular Assistance and Rights and Remedies: Comments on the /Cl's 
Judgment in the laGrand Case (2001) available at http://www.ejil.org/journal/curdevs/sr24.html. 
37 ILC Commentary on State Responsibility, supra note I 5, at 216. 
38 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 2002 S.I.C.J. art. 38, available at http://www.icj­
cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm#CHAPTER_II 
39 Raj Bhala, The Myth about Stare Decisis and International Trade law, 14 AM. U. lNT'L. L. 
REV. 845, 921 (1999). 
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tated by the logical ease of malting two consistent judgments. If not included 
in customary international law, the Court may not decide a dispute or assign 
a remedy not included in the treaty. Properly summarized, 
The International Court is not a legislative body established to formulate 
new rules of law. In a sense this is stating the obvious. Nevertheless, 
confusion persists. The Court, like all courts, applies the existing law. It 
does not 'create' new rules of law either for the parties to a given dispute 
or for the international community at large.40 
The issue of ensuring that the Court acts within the confines of its 
ascribed judicial function has been substantially explored in assessing the 
latitude of its power to give advisory opinions. In contrast to AGNRs, the 
ICJ Statute does grant the Court power to give advisory opinions.41 Despite 
this explicit delineation, it was argued in the Nuclear Weapons Case42 that 1) 
limitations in the UN Charter restrict the Security Council's ability to seek an 
advisory opinion, and 2) an advisory opinion would require the Court to en­
gage in policymaking akin to legislation in order to issue a coherent judg­
ment.43 The Court rejected these arguments and, in determining the scope for 
its decision, held that issuing an opinion on the legality of threatening the use 
of or using nuclear weapons was within its judicial purview. The Court de­
fended the legality of its advisory opinion, stating, "the Court must identify 
the existing principles and rules, interpret them and apply them to the threat 
or use of nuclear weapons, thus offering a reply to the question posed based 
on law."44 As to the charge that such a judgment would amount to legisla­
tion, the Court held: 
It is clear that the Court cannot legislate, and, in the circumstances of the 
present case, it is not called upon to do so. Rather its task is to engage in 
its normal judicial function of ascertaining the existence or otherwise of 
legal principles and rules applicable to the threat or use of nuclear weap­
ons. The contention that the giving of an answer to the question posed 
would require the Court to legislate is based on a supposition that the 
pre.sent corpus juris is devoid of relevant rules in this matter. The Court 
could not accede to this argument; it states the existing law and does not 
legislate. This is so even if, in stating and applying the law, the Court 
necessarily has to specify its scope and sometimes note its general 
trend.45 
40 SHABTAI RosENNE, THE WoRLD CouRT: WHAT IT Is AND How IT WORKS 38 (5th ed. 1 995). 
41 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 2002 S.I.C.J. art. 65-66. 
-12 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.CJ. 226 (July 8). 
·B Id. 
44 Id. at 234. 
-15 Id. at 237. 
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The Court's statement demonstrates that as recently as 1996, its juris­
prudence recognized that the purpose of the ICJ is to examine the corpus 
juris relative to the question presented and apply the appropriate body of law. 
In doing so, it is appropriate for the Court to note the apparent direction of 
the body of law, but until the trend has reached the point of incorporation in 
relevant corpus juris , it remains non-binding dicta. Under customary inter­
national law, corpus juris includes current practices of states that may poten­
tially be hardening into customary international law and precludes the 
predilections of international law scholars' opinions of where the law should 
be. The adherence to established corpus juris has been accepted through 
numerous judicial decisions from the inception of the ICJ.46 In Haya de la 
Torre, an asylum case, the Court held that it lacked the ability to guide Co­
lumbia in its compliance with an earlier Court judgment.47 The Court ex­
plained its holding as follows: 
Having thus defined in accordance with the Havana Convention, the legal 
relations between the Parties with regard to the matters referred to it, the 
Court has completed its t ask. It is unable to give any practical advice as 
to the various courses which might be followed with a view toward termi­
nating the asylum, since, by doing so, it would depart from its judicial 
function.48 
This doctrine is based on a belief that substantial intervention by the ICJ into 
national affairs may violate sovereignty and promote the possibility of back­
lash against other international institutions. Such a backlash, in which na­
tions lose respect for the designated international institutions, would 
ultimately lead to their demise as it did with the ICJ's predecessor, the Per­
manent Court of International Justice prior to World War II. 
Before LaGrand, the ICJ limited itself to assigning remedies under the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) and/or customary inter­
national law. Germany, in its Fourth Submission to the Court, asked the ICJ 
to require the United States to give it a guarantee of non-repetition. The 
Court's decision on this matter cemented ILC Article 30. 
The facts of the case were as follows: Karl and Walter LaGrand were 
two German nationals who had resided in the United States since their arrival 
as young children in 1967.49 On January 7, 1982, they were arrested in Ari­
zona for involvement in an attempted bank robbery in Marana, Arizona. In 
46 The Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa), Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.CJ. 31, 57 
(June 12). 
41 Haya de la Torre (Colum. v. Peru), 1951 l.C.J. 71, 83 (June 13). 
48 Id. 
49 Arizona v. LaGrand, 734 P.2d 563, 565 (Ariz. 1987). 
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the course of the robbery, one bank employee was murdered and another 
seriou sly injured. In 1984, both were convicted of first-degree murder, at­
tempted murder, attempted armed robbery, and two counts of kidnapping.50 
The death sentence was imposed on both men 11 months later. The case 
proceeded to the Supreme Court of Arizona, which denied post-conviction 
relief in January 1987. Another petition for post-conviction relief was denied 
in state court, and was upheld by the Supreme Court of Arizona in 1990 and 
the United States Supreme Court in 1991.51 
The LaGrands were not properly informed of their relevant rights under 
the VCCR at any time during conviction, sentencing, and the first set of 
appeal s.52 Similarly, none of the proper authorities informed the German 
consulate of the charges facing the LaGrand brothers or of their imminent 
sentencing. 53 Instead, the LaGrands were informed of the r ight to consular 
assistance by a third party and informed the German consulate of their situa­
tion in June 1992. 54 
In 1995, the LaGrands sought to have their convictions and sentences 
set aside in federal district court based, among other things, on the fact that 
U.S. authorities, in violation of the VCCR, failed to notify the German con­
sulate of their arrest. The petition was denied by the federal court, which 
found that the argument based on the U.S. violation of the VCCR was proce­
durally barred due to failure to raise the claim in Arizona state court. ss The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the decision 
on January 16, 1998.56 
The Supreme Court of Arizona scheduled the execution of Karl 
LaGrand on February 24 and the execution of Walter LaGrand on the March 
3. Karl LaGrand's final federal appeals were denied and he was executed as 
scheduled. 57 The day before the scheduled execution of Walter LaGrand, 
Germany sought the ICJ' s intervention by asking for interim protection pend­
ing the consideration of the case before the Court. Germany's petition was 
granted and the ICJ issued an interim measure asking the U.S. government to 
50 Id. 
51 State v. LaGrand, 734 P.2d 563 (Ariz. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872 (1987). 
52 Jennifer Lynne Weinman, The Clash Between U.S. Criminal Procedure and the Vienna Con­
vemion on Consular Relations: An Analysis of the International Court of Justice Decision in the 
LaGrand Case, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 857, 859 (2002). 
53 Id. at 867. 
54 Id. 
55 La Grand v. Stewart, 170 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir. 1999). 
56 Id. 
57 William J. Aceves, International Decision: LaGrand (Germany v. United States), 96 A.J.I.L. 
210, 210 (2002). 
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"take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not exe­
cuted pending the final decision in these proceedings."58 Despite the interim 
order, Walter LaGrand was executed.59 
In the ultimate proceedings in the International Court of Justice, the 
U.S. argued primarily that AGNRs are not an acceptable remedy to be con­
sidered by the ICJ under international law. 6° Further, to the extent the Court 
might find an AGNR attractive, the U.S. had already gone to great lengths to 
reduce the likelihood that a similar violation would occur in the future.61 
Included in these efforts were the mass production of guidance pamphlets for 
law enforcement, training programs, and potential punishment for law en­
forcement that did not follow Vienna Convention guidelines. In support of 
the original claim for a GNR and the revised request of an ANR, the German 
government argued that AGNRs were recently embraced by the ILC Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility, U.S. repetition was a realistic possibility, 
and the executed defendants suffered too severe a harm to be solved solely 
by an apology. 62 
In its judgment, the ICJ tentatively sided with Germany, noting that, "an 
apology is not sufficient in this case," or in any other case where Vienna 
Convention rights are infringed resulting in "prolonged detention or . . se­
vere penalties."63 In making its pronouncement, the court did not clearly ex­
plain its justification for using AGNRs under customary international law. 
Instead, it simply declared that in a case with risk of repetition present, an 
apology does not provide an appropriate remedy.64 
m. A CRITIQUE OF LAGRAND: THE EFFECT OF THE RISE OF AGNRs 
Customary international law imposes obligations on states but does not 
specify how those obligations shall be met within the domestic realm. Inter­
national courts are empowered to find violations of international law and 
58 Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.CJ. 
Order of Provisional Measures para. 29 (Mar. 3). 
59 The World in Brief, WASH. PosT, March 4, 1999, at Al6. 
60 LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), I.C.J. Oral Pleadings paras. 5.1-.43, 7.1-.15 (Nov. 14, 2000, at 
3 p.m.), http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idockeUigus/iguscr/igus_icr2000-29.html (last visited Jan. 
22, 2003). 
61 Id. at paras. 7.16-.27. 
62 LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), l.C.J. Oral Pleadings (Nov. 16, 2000), available at http:// 
www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/iguscr/igus_icr2000-30.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2003). 
63 LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), I.CJ. para. 123 (June 27, 2001), available at http://www.icj­
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusjudgmenUigus_ijudgment_20010625.htm (last visited Jan. · 22, 
2003). 
64 Id. 
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remedy them, but the LaGrand decision, by embracing the ILC Article 30 on 
AGNRs, opens the door to changing this doctrine and does so with no legal 
foundation. 
The previous section set out the two pillars of justification for AGNRs: 
the ILC codification of state responsibility and the ICJ judgment in LaGrand. 
This section explores the fragility of those pillars, demonstrating that the 
only foundation for the actions of each institution is the legitimacy of the 
other. Both the ILC and ICJ are required to take account of and, to different 
degrees, base their work on existing customary international law to ensure 
legitimacy. However, the only basis the ICJ uses in finding AGNRs as a 
legitimate remedy is the ILC codification of state responsibility, while the 
basis for codification of AGNRs in Article 30 is the ICJ decision in 
LaGrand. The result is a fatally flawed foundation that undercuts AGNR 
viability and is harmful to the legitimacy of international law. Further, the 
formulation set out in La.Grand, again based on Article 30 of the ILC Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility, provides very little guidance and results in a 
system that is both counterproductive to its stated goals and poorly allocates 
resources. In setting out these arguments, I consider the foundations relied 
upon by both the ILC and ICJ and discuss the weaknesses of those 
foundations. 
A. The International La.w Commission 's Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility 
The ILC Articles on State Responsibility "seek to formulate, by way of 
codification and progressive development, the basic rules of international law 
concerning the responsibility of States for their internationally wrongful 
acts."65 The traditional account of customary international law holds that a 
principle reaches customary international law status through a two-part pro­
cess: first, via widespread and uniform state practice, which, secondly, be­
comes ultimately regarded by states as having the binding force of law (often 
referred to as opinio juris) .66 The notion of opinio juris attempts to decipher 
the motivation of the state in its decision to recognize a principle as a re­
quirement under international law. The principle "hardens" into part of cus­
tomary international law when there is a finding that the nation believed it 
was bound to follow the principle as a notion of law.67 This formulation is 
based in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases where the ICJ, in discussing 
65 ILC Commentary on State Responsibility, supra note 15, at 59. 
66 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 102(2) (1986). 
67 Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. Cm. L. 
REV. 1 1 1 3 , 1116-17 (1999). 
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whether an Article of the 1 95 8  Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 
had become customary international law, said that in order for it to have 
attained such status it would "be necessary that the provision concerned 
should, at all events potentially, be of a fundamentally norm-creating charac­
ter such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law. "68 
In this case, the Court recognized the reciprocal n ature of international obli­
gations as key to the resolution of conflict and creation of international law. 
There does not exist, however, enough state use of AGNRs to consider 
them customary international law or as part of an emerging trend in the law. 
To the extent that the state practice element is fulfilled, it is unlikely that 
nations have begun to view the imposition of AGNRs as binding customary 
international law. There is also no modem trend that would j ustify court 
usage of AGNRs under the ILC' s  mandate of progressive development. 
While the ILC can consider the progressive movement of international 
law, its standard for assessing progressive development has been finding 
modem trends in the law, not open ended political goals.69 The ILC is not 
required to differentiate proposals it considers "progressive development," 
but often does so to counter arguments that portions of its work are not sup­
ported by customary international law.70 In the case of AGNRs, if the ILC 
had shielded such work as part of its progressive development mandate, it 
would have weakened its argument of prior widespread ratification of 
AGNRs by abandoning the binding legal n ature of customary international 
law found in codification.71 The ICJ would not have been able to apply 
AGNRs as a recognized remedy without explicit state consent in a treaty . 
68 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.) (F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1 969 I.CJ. 3 (Feb. 20). 
69 Generally, "progressive development" efforts are intended to prod movement of the law and are 
not taken from scratch. Ultimately, a goal of the "progressive development" aspect of ILC work is 
that the proposals eventually become part of customary international law. See Daniel N. Hylton, 
Default Breakdown: The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ' Inadequate Framework on 
Reservations, 27 VANn. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 419, 447 & n. 1 88 ( 1 994). 
10 Article 41 (particular consequences of a serious breach of an obligation under this chapter) and 
Article 48 (invocation of responsibility by a State other than an injured State) are the only articles 
specifically recognized as derived from progressive development as opposed to codification in the 
ILC State Responsibility Articles. U.N. GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 53, U.N. Doc.N56/ 1 0  
(2001); id. at 56. 
71 Many governments commented on the large degree of progressive development within the ILC 
draft, although not explicitly including Article 30 in their assessment. These countries included: 
Austria, France, Ireland, Japan, Mongolia, Netherlands, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, and the 
United States. U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 1 8, at 5 1 ,  U.N. Doc. A/56/ 1 0  (200 1 ) ; see U.N. 
GAOR, International Law Commission, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/488 ( 1 998); see also Com­
ments and Observations Received from U.N. GAOR International Law Comm., 50th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/45 15 ( 1998). 
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This is so because if a provision is recognized as a progressive development 
it implicitly does not reflect current law ; if not a part of current law, it cannot 
be applied without consent. As such, the ICJ does not recognize !LC-created 
provisions based on "progressive development" as binding law.72 This argu­
ment was recognized by the U . S. in oral argument: 
While it may be entirely appropriate for the International Law Commis­
sion, in fulfillment of its mandate for the progressive development of in­
ternational law, to identify obligations that may not be reflections of 
current law, it would not be appropriate for this Court to impose such an 
obligation on a State appearing before it that has not accepted such an 
obligation. 73 
Further decisions by the ICJ have tweaked the traditional customary in­
ternational law standard while keeping its formal elements and basic theory 
intact. A relevant example is the reduced importance of state practice and 
the increased reliance on the Court' s analysis of whether states have acted 
due to a sense of legal obligation. This is demonstrated in the ICJ' s reason­
ing that the presence of customary rules "can be tested by induction based on 
the analysis of a sufficiently extensive and convincing practice, and not by 
deduction from preconceived ideas."74 Thus, if the state appears to be acting 
out of obligation it demonstrates the widespread nature of the practice. 75 
Other cases have confirmed this trend by finding the existence of multilateral 
treaties and international agreements as nearly dispositive on the existence of 
customary international law without examination of actual practice.76 
Historically, customary international law has been applied to basic 
norms and widely accepted notions of international principles regarding the 
law of war and the treatment of aliens. More modern approaches to custom-
72 Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.CJ. 3, 22-33 (July 25); on the general issue of ICJ 
distaste for judicial adoption of progressive development, see Michael Reisman, Metamorphoses: 
Judge Shigeru Oda and the International Court of Justice, 1995 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 185. 
73 LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), I.CJ. Oral Pleadings para. 5.19 (Nov. 14, 2000, at 3 p.m.), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/iguscr/igus_icr2000-29.html (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2003). 
74 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.CJ. 
299 (Oct. 1 2). 
75 There is an obvious circularity in this argument. If opinio juris demonstrates practice, practice 
would just as probatively demonstrate opinio juris in many cases. This reasoning seems to ignore 
the real possibility that States often act out of "courtesy, convenience, and tradition" as noted by the 
!CJ in North Sea Continental Shelf. Also if there are evidence problems in finding practice, there 
are obviously more problems in ascertaining motive for governmental decisions and whose motiva­
tions in the government would be most relevant. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; 
F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.CJ. 3 (Feb. 20). 
76 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. US), 1986 I.CJ. 1 4  
(June 27). 
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ary international law also include human rights norms that have garnered 
broad acceptance and which have often been committed to textual instru­
ments. More recently, these basic norms that serve as the cornerstone of 
customary international law have become more accommodating, with poten­
tial extension to government-assured paid holidays as part of customary in­
ternational law.77  However, a real assessment of the legitimacy of a practice 
under customary international law should examine whether the elements of a 
traditional creation of customary international law exist and the impact of 
recognizing these new norms. In making this assessment it is important to 
critically examine the elements of customary international law formation to 
find what satisfies these elements. Ultimately, if AGNRs do not satisfy the 
test, then neither the ICJ's nor any other international tribunal' s  use of them 
is legitimate without explicit reference in the applicable treaty. 
In its earlier work, the ILC recognized that while it was interested in 
AGNRs as a proper remedy under codification, there existed little customary 
international law basis for it.78 During its discussion of the proposal to codify 
AGNRs, commission participants noted that while it may not be uncommon 
for governments to give assurances of behavior similar to ANRs, it was far 
from clear that such a statement could be considered undertaking a legal 
consequence related to state responsibility.79 Further, the state practice 
seemed to be most dominant in the 19th century and, thus, would be difficult 
to characterize as either codification or recognition of the progressive devel­
opment of the law.80 The ILC also recognized that there had been no cases 
where courts had clearly required AGNRs. 81 
In basing the validity of AGNRs on customary international law, the 
ILC commentary mentions several instances in which governments or tribu­
nals have engaged in diplomatic practice resembling the ILC definition of 
AGNRs. Besides the LaGrand case, the ILC mentions the following: a pres­
idential speech by Lyndon Johnson demanding the Soviet Union provide ad­
equate security for the U . S. embassy in Moscow; the "Dogger Bank" incident 
of 1904 where the UK requested "security against . . .  recurrence;" an ex-
77 John 0. McGinnis, A New Agenda for International Human Rights: Economic Freedom. 48 
CATH. U. L. REv. 1029, 1 030 (1999). 
78 Implicitly, comments within the ILC regarding the lack of state practice or opinio Juris on 
AGNRs hints that Article 30 is more "progressive development" than codification. However, since 
the ILC included historical examples in its commentaries to Article 30 in an apparent attempt to 
j ustify it under customary international law, my analysis wil l continue in that vein. 
79 Report of the International Law Commission , V.N. GAOR 52nd Sess., Supp. No. 1 0, para. 88 
at 29, U.N. Doc. N55/IO (2000): 
so Id. 
81 Id. 
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change of notes between China and Indonesia in 1 966 regarding consular 
security in Jakarta; a 1901 case where the Ottoman empire made a formal 
assurance that certain foreign postal services would operate freely in its terri­
tory; an incident of seizure of German ships during the Boer war ( 1 899-
1900) where Germany told Britain that it must issue instructions not to seize 
German merchant ships not in a war zone; and the "Doane" incident where 
assurances against repetition were made in 1 886.82 Additionally, the ILC of­
fers a handful of examples from the Human Rights Committee (HRC) where 
the HRC has requested repeal or modification to domestic law. 83 
However, it should be noted that the historical examples used by the 
ILC are not court-issued AGNRs but demonstrate only diplomatic use. The 
request of assurances or guarantees by another nation is  appropriate in diplo­
macy but does not equal the Article 30 proposal by the ILC that courts wield 
such tools as an international remedy. Rather , only numerous examples of 
courts issuing remedies very similar to Article 30 AGNRs, and those reme­
dies being followed, would suffice to create customary international law. 
Even if taken as doctrinal reflections of AGNRs, the ILC examples of 
diplomatic use of AGNRs do not reveal either sufficient state practice or 
evidence of opinio juris necessary to create customary international law. It 
may be common for diplomats to use assurances that a violation will not 
occur in the future, or even go so far as to change domestic policy, but they 
do so for purposes of leveraging in diplomatic relations-not obligation 
under law. Rather than demonstrating opinio juris , such actions more likely 
reflect coincidence of interest or coercion.84 The ILC' s examples of the Otto­
man Empire assuring operation of the British post and of the "Dogger Bank" 
case came at a high point of British imperialist power. The Boer War request 
to respect the international law notion of "free ship, free goods" and the em­
bassy security dispute between the USSR and the US were between equal 
powers with the ability and inclination to provide reciprocity. In contrast, the 
Afghani request for U.S. assurances of non-intervention and the Chechen 
request for Russian non-repetition of internationally wrongful fighting were 
not respected because the elements of coincidence of interest or effective 
coercion were absent. If opinio Juris existed in these practices, there would 
be several examples of AGNR requests being followed in the absence of 
reciprocal interests or coercion. 
82 !LC Commentary on State Responsibility, supra note 15, at 219, 22 1 -22 nn.470-71 and 474-75. 
83 Id. 
84 See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 67 (an incisive examination of customary international 
law principles affected by coincidence of interest or coercion). 
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Due to the lack of evidence satisfying the traditional test of customary 
international law, the ILC's adoption of its proposed article regarding 
AGNRs was illegitimate. This is because there are serious questions, recog­
nized within the ILC, as to whether AGNRs can be considered legal conse­
quences of an internationally wrongful act. 85 The ILC' s concerns focused on 
whether such a remedy could be considered a part of customary international 
law and a debate over the efficacy of imposing additional obligations on 
nations that could potentially lead to another breach. This secondary breach 
would be a breach of a remedy, which would have to be enforced through the 
imposition of yet another remedial measure. 86 When first considering the 
proposal, the ILC passed the issue to the ICJ for reinforcement before adop­
tion took place. It did this by suspending adoption of Article 30 until after 
the ICJ made its judgment on Germany's submission for AGNRs in 
LaGrand.87 Following the ICJ decision, Article 30 was accepted in the final 
form of the draft articles. 
B. The International Court of Justice 's Decision in LaGrand 
In La.Grand, the ICJ, by embracing the ILC argument for recognition of 
AGNRs as part of customary international law, goes beyond past jurispru­
dence and the limitations set out in its founding statute. In order to rule on 
Germany' s fourth submission requesting ANRs, the ICJ first looked to find 
this power under the Vienna Convention of Consular Relations (VCCR) Op­
tional Protocol. 88 The absence of any particular provision in the V CCR or 
any other major treaty regarding AGNRs as viable judicial remedies means 
that if the use of AGNRs were to be legitimate, it must receive its legitimacy 
through customary international law. The ICJ found the necessary jurisdic­
tion in La.Grand by relying on a general rule that in the absence of explicit 
language on the subject of remedies, the Court is empowered with the ability 
to decide such issues under customary international law. 89 In its assessment 
85 James Crawford, Jacqueline Peel & Simon Olleson, The ILC's Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: Completion of the Second Reading, 1 2  EuR. J. INT' L L. 
963 (2001). 
86 This second concern was crystallized by Special Rapporteur Crawford in his assessment that it 
would be difficult to impose sanctions based on a breach of failure to provide AGNRs when so 
ordered. See James Crawford, Special Rapporteur, Third Report of the on State Responsibility, 
International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR 52nd Sess., at 26 para. 58, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/507 
(2000) [hereinafter Third Special Rapporteur Report]. 
87 Tams, supra note 36, at n.81. 
88 LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), l.C.J. paras. 46-48 (June 27, 2001), available at http://www.icj­
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusjudgment/igus_ijudgment_20010625.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 
2003). 
89 Id. at paras. 35-63. 
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of customary international law, the court relied on Germany' s  argument that 
the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility should be a guide. 
The Court found a difference between AGNRs and mere actions de­
signed to prevent breaches90 by stating that a general effort to avoid a breach 
is a "general assurance of non-repetition," and as such did not satisfy Ger­
many's request for a specific assurance of non-repetition of the procedural 
errors leading to the execution of the LaGrand brothers.91 The ICJ made this 
distinction by finding that the U.S. declarations showing a desire to comply 
in the future were different than specific measures enacted to actively prevent 
such breaches. Thus, declarations of willingness to comply could satisfy 
general assurances of non-repetition but would not constitute a more specific 
guarantee.92 While denying Germany' s  original submission of a specific as­
surance or guarantee of non-repetition, the court concluded that the U.S.  was 
required to "allow the review and reconsideration of the conviction and sen­
tence by talcing account of the violation of the rights set forth in the Conven­
tion. This obligation can be carried out in various ways."93 
As the La.Grand case progressed, Germany changed its original written 
submission for specific guarantees of non-repetition into a less controversial, 
but theoretically similar demand for assurances of non-repetition, which was 
then argued orally in front of the court.94 The German argument advocating 
the use of AGNRs closely mirrored the development of the proposal within 
the ILC framework. First, it was noted in general argument that the ILC 
changed the classification of AGNRs from remedial to preventive remedies 
and, thus, equated them with requests for cessation: 
[W]ith regard to assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, the propos­
als made by the Drafting Committee effected a certain change: while the 
draft adopted at first reading referred in Article 46 to such guarantees as 
one particular form of reparation, the guarantees are now combined to­
gether in draft Article 30 with the duty of the responsible State to cease 
its breaches. In doing so, the Drafting Committee followed the view of 
Special Rapporteur James Crawford, and others, that assurances and guar­
antees of non-repetition perform a distinct and autonomous function; they 
90 The U.S. argued that its efforts to ensure compliance (pamphlets, education, etc.) should be 
seen as appropriate satisfaction for Germany. 
91 LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), I.CJ. para. 1 24 (June 27, 2001 ), available at http://www.icj­
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusjudgment/igus_ijudgment_2001 0625.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 
2003). See also Tams, supra note 36, at 17. 
92 See LaGrand Case, supra note 9 1 ,  at para. 1 24. 
93 Id. at para. 1 25. 
94 Notably, the oral argument for Germany on its demand for assurances of non-repetition was 
made by Bruno Simma, an accomplished international law scholar, and, unsurprisingly, a member 
of the ILC. 
· 
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are future-oriented and serve a preventive rather than a remedial 
purpose.95 
This argument warrants two observations. First, it distinguishes the 
change made from the written pleadings, which depended on Article 46 (the 
predecessor to Article 30). In arguing for the use of the ILC draft as a basis 
for legal legitimacy, Germany had to make note of this change. Otherwise it 
would have been irrelevant to note that it was not coupled with cessation. 
This is cemented in the further comment that this change in the draft actual1y 
provides legal grounding for the proposition of AGNRs by tying them to 
cessation. In fact, Professor Simma, arguing for Germany, cites this argu­
ment as the "legal foundation [of AGNRs] which was accepted by the Inter­
national Law Commission."96 Pursuant to this reasoning, if cessation is a 
legally accepted principle, then under Germany's  argument, AGNRs ought to 
be considered part of cessation and thus part of customary international law. 
However, while members of the ILC certainly did believe that coupling 
the ideas together was more theoretically coherent, there appear to be few 
other customary ties between the two notions. Cessation may relate to future 
activity so far as the international wrong is continuing, but the concept of 
AGNRs extends beyond not only the actual facts of the case, but beyond the 
parties in litigation. This is supported by the ILC's commentaries that ex­
plain that cessation specifically applies to "continuing" wrongful acts. 97 In 
contrast, AGNRs extend into factual situations not considered at the time of 
their issuance and circumstances that have not yet taken place. 
Germany asserted that AGNRs are "firmly anchored in international 
law," but failed to provide any argument that the elements of customary in­
ternational law were satisfied. Instead, Germany remarked that "[i]t is re­
markable to see how [the ILC's] proposal to expressly restate assurances and 
guarantees of non-repetition as a distinct consequence of breaches of interna­
tional law adopted by the ILC, was quickly followed by State practice."98 
This statement was backed by citing one case before the ICJ, 99 an amicable 
95 LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), I.CJ. Oral Pleadings sec. VIII para. 10 (Nov. 13, 2000, at 3 
p.m.), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icj www/idocket/igus/iguscr/igus_icr2000-27 .html (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2003). 
96 Id. at sec. VII para. 22. 
97 ILC Commentary on State Responsibility, supra note 15, at 221. 
98 LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), I.CJ. Oral Pleadings sec. VIIl para. 23 (Nov. 13, 2000, at 3 
p.m.), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/iguscr/igus_icr2000-27 .html (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2003). 
99 Id. (citing Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.CJ. 7, 12, 16, 17 (Sept. 
25)). 
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settlement before the European Court of Human Rights ,  100 and a list of  cases 
decided in front of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 101 Germany 
concluded by noting that "neither in their comments on the ILC draft articles 
adopted at first reading in 1996, nor in the recent Sixth Committee debates, 
[did] any government [suggest] the deletion of the draft article embodying 
our assurances and guarantees." 102 
By neglecting even to attempt to find foundation for AGNRs in custom­
ary international law, Germany failed to provide the ICJ with any valid basis 
for embracing the controversial remedy. Instead Germany hung its entire 
case for AGNRs on the ILC' s Article 30 proposal. The fact that govern­
ments have subsequently utilized ILC proposals to bolster their cases and 
acquire actions of other governments does not give legal validity to AGNRs 
but instead demonstrates the opposite-that they were not a true part of state 
practice prior to ILC codification, nor were they considered part of interna­
tional law. If they had been so considered, why would governments just now 
start to seek them in front of international tribunals? 
Similarly, the argument that governments had not requested the deletion 
of Article 30 is both irrelevant and misleading. The fact that a body like the 
Sixth Committee does not actively object to a specific portion of a draft arti­
cles does not mean that it either ascribes to the reasoning used by the ILC in 
justifying the article or that it thinks that it is part of customary international 
law. The Sixth Committee and General Assembly are not required to follow 
customary international law. They may believe that the policy behind 
AGNRs is wise and thus that it should be a part of state responsibility. How­
ever, that does not mean that they think such policy is part of customary 
international law, or that they are required to investigate the legal status of 
AGNRs. Instead, that function is for international courts like the ICJ and, to 
a more limited extent, bodies like the ILC. Therefore, the opinion of the 
Sixth Committee is generally irrelevant in assessing whether a proposal is 
consistent with customary international law. Additionally, Germany's argu­
ment that the Sixth Committee's  silence implies consent is rejected by inter­
national law. In the issue of reservations to treaties, bodies like the Human 
Rights Committee have held that the failure of countries to object to a partic­
ular reservation does not equal acquiescence to that position, much less advo­
cacy of it. 1 03 Also, the purpose of receiving comments and observations from 
100 ld. (citing Denmark v. Turkey, 2000-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 8-10 para. 2 1  (2000)). 
1 0 1  Id. (citing Castillo Petrnzzi et al., Case 52, Inter-Am. C.H.R. para. 222, ser. C (1999); Tamayo, 
Case 42, Inter-Am. C.H.R. para. 164, ser. C (1998)). 
102 Id. 
103 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights and Conditional Consent, 149 
U. PA. L.  REV. 399, 436 (2000). 
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governments is not to have them examine if each provision properly reflects 
customary international law. The governments, while encouraged to give 
feedback, are not the crafters of the draft articles as they would be in the case 
of a treaty. Governments may have had a myriad of reasons for commenting 
or remaining silent that had nothing to do with their opinion of AGNRs as 
part of customary international law. 
Second, there have been several expressions of doubt about the validity 
of AGNRs. In 1998, Germany noted in its comments to the ILC regarding 
then Article 46 (which included AGNRs), that, "[s]ome doubt exists . . .  as to 
whether the injured State has, under customary international law, the right to 
'guarantees of non-repetition' . . . . To impose an obligation to guarantee 
non-repetition in all cases would certainly go beyond what State practice 
deems to be appropriate."104 In the same report, Uzbekistan commented that 
the article on AGNRs should assess what types of AGNRs a state could be 
entitled to obtain. 105 In the next compilation of comments from governments 
regarding the Draft Articles of State Responsibility the United States advo­
cated deletion of the AGNRs section, "as it reflects neither customary inter­
national law nor State practice."106 
Although not explicitly relied upon in La,Grand, a classic argument in 
favor of application of AGNRs is that they essentially do not ask the violat­
ing state to do anything that they did not agree to do in the first place and 
that, as a result, they are amenable to customary international law and an 
assessment of the burden that this obligation would entail was already ac­
cepted by the state before the issuance of an AGNR. This argument fail s  to 
recognize the forward-looking obligation-imposing nature of AGNRs and the 
degree of specificity necessary to be effective. Unlike cessation, AGNRs do 
not deal with stopping a continuing violation of international law, but rather 
force prospective changes within domestic law in order to avoid the possibil­
ity of a future violation. This change from repairing past harms to avoiding 
future ones is likely to be both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. It is over­
inclusive because, although not mandated in La,Grand, under the ILC frame­
work an effective AGNR could easily result in a mandated change under 
domestic law that is neutral on its face, but may nevertheless result in a 
violation of international law. For example, in La.Grand a procedural default 
104 State Responsibility: Comments and Observations Received from Governments, U.N. GAOR, 
International Law Commission, 50th Sess., at 103, U.N. Doc. NCN.4/448 (1 998) available at http:/ 
/www.un.org/law/ilc/sessions/50/doclist.htm. 
!OS Id. at 1 13. 
106 State Responsibility: Comments and Observations Received from Governments, U.N. GAOR, 
International Law Commission, 53d Sess., at 36, U.N. Doc. NCN.41515 (2001) available at http:// 
www .un.org/law/ilc/sessions/53/53docs.htm. 
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(failure to demonstrate prejudice resulting from the lack of consular notifica­
tion) precluded re-trial of the LaGrand brothers. Obviously, a repeal of the 
procedural default doctrine leading to this preclusion would be drastically 
over-inclusive-many people not covered by the VCCR would be able to use 
the changed law to their advantage. 
Additionally, requiring a change in procedural default by changing legal 
definitions of "cause" or "prejudice" would also not ensure that violations of 
this kind would not occur in the future. In LaGrand, a more relaxed defini­
tion of "cause" or an elimination of the "prejudice" standard would have 
resulted in a different outcome. However, in its judgment, the ICJ simply 
noted that national courts are required to consider the violations of the right 
to consular assistance, not to guarantee a particular result from that consider­
ation. 107 Under this rule, it is still possible for national courts to read the 
requirements of procedural default as to make the impact of such an assess­
ment negligible. If this were done, the state would likely still be in violation 
of Article 36 of the VCCR. As a result, the ICJ would need to continue to 
monitor and mold any AGNR to ensure that the order fit comfortably with 
the obligations of the treaty within the application of domestic law. 
The Court's  finding that the U.S.  was required to allow review and re­
consideration and that an apology was not enough seems to be a tentative 
endorsement of the view that AGNRs are a stronger remedy than mere cessa­
tion. In ruling that the LaGrand case represented a situation of a severe 
penalty and that such a penalty could not be remedied by mere apologies, the 
Court appears to be assessing the "nature of the obligation and breach" as 
recommended by the ILC. In so doing, it is saying that in run-of-the-mill 
cases of violation of the Vienna Convention, AGNRs may not be an appro­
priate remedy, but in the case of a "serious" breach, the Court may require a 
more specific AGNR (although it declined to do so in LaGrand). 
In summary, with the LaGrand judgment, the ICJ utilized the legal basis 
concocted by the ILC in making its decision on Germany' s  Fourth Submis­
sion regarding AGNRs. What the Court failed to do was to provide any 
guidance or commentary about how such orders will or should be utilized in 
the future. This lack of guidance, coupled with reliance on the work of the 
ILC for the legal establishment of AGNRs leaves an open question regarding 
how such a potentially far-reaching remedial measure should be used. This 
burden is even greater since the traditional markers of customary interna­
tional law are not present. 
107 LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), I.CJ. para. 91 (June 27, 2001), available at http://www.icj­
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusjudgment/igus_ijudgment_200 1 0625.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 
2003). 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF AGNR ADOPTION UNDER THE ILC/ICJ 
FRAMEWORK! THE TAINT OF ILLEGITIMACY 
WITH No RoAD MAP 
The lack of guiding instructions in the ICJ judgment creates an addi­
tional obstacle to any potential benefits from devices designed to avoid the 
breach of international obligations. In this section I examine the difficu lt 
problems presented by the unwillingness of the ICJ to create clearer guide­
lines for future application of its powerful new tool. 
The adoption of AGNRs leads to substantial problems with legitimacy 
and taints the institutions that elevated it. I examine the negative conse­
quences of AGNR adoption by reviewing its relation to international legal 
compliance in both vertical and horizontal legal structures. Legal thought 
regarding legitimacy as an instrument for attaining heightened efficacy and 
compliance of international law can be used as a lens through which to view 
the adoption of AGNRs . 108 I conclude that poor policy and illegitimate adop­
tion of AGNRs will lead to less effective international institutions and legal 
rules. 
A. !LC Guidance for Application 
The ILC draft Articles of State Responsibility make it clear that AGNRs 
are not always appropriate. They also offer very little other guidance as to 
the circumstances that would be appropriate for their use. The ILC commen­
tary explaining their application notes :  
[A]ssurances and guarantees of non-repetition will not always b e  appro­
priate, even if demanded. Much will depend on the circumstances of the 
case, including the nature of the obligation and of the breach. The rather 
exceptional character of the measures is indicated by the words "if the 
circumstances so require" at the end of subparagraph (b ). The obligation 
of the responsible State with respect to [AGNRs] is formulated in flexible 
terms in order to prevent the kinds of abusive or excessive claims which 
characterized some demands for assurances and guarantees by States in 
the past. 109 
The commentary notes factors that must be considered when determin­
ing whether to apply AGNRs, including, "when appropriate," the "nature of 
the obligation and of the breach,'' and "if the circumstances so require." This 
language is not particularly clear, but surrounding language indicates that the 
108 In particular the scholarship of Thomas Franck, infra notes 121 and 125, and Harold Hongju 
Koh, infra note 1 1 5, on the subject. To a lesser extent, the work of Lewis Henkin, infra note l I 6, 
and from the realm of international relations, the research by the Chayes,' infra note 1 28. 
109 Id. at 165. 
Changing the Premise of International Legal Remedies 29 1 
ILC intended that AGNRs be used to combat repetitive breach and avoid 
irreparable harms, both of which are damaging to international relationships 
between states. 1 10  
Most noticeably absent from the ILC's analysis is  any explicit reference 
to the burden imposed on the infringing state in order to carry out requested 
AGNRs. 1 1 1  The ILC formulation of AGNRs to aid in the reparation of the 
states' legal relationship focuses solely on the impact on future infringement. 
The burden of implementing an AGNR could be enormous, especially when 
judicially crafted, even when the legal relationship between the parties on 
any given issue is only mildly damaged. Even worse, enforcement burdens 
could result in the reluctance of the infringing state to take part in interna­
tional treaties that may subject it to AGNRs in the future. 1 12 
International treaties, and international law generally, are largely based 
on a consent model that allows for parties to agree to international obliga­
tions willingly and withhold consent from agreements they find objectiona­
ble. Any implementation of AGNRs has the potential to upset the delicate 
balance inherent in the consent-based model. While limited infringement 
would most likely be tolerated in circumstances where its costs were substan­
tially lower than the costs associated with fighting it, the more substantial the 
infringements would engender more distrust and distaste for the process. 
More importantly, unwise AGNR use would result in an additional interna­
tional obligation without consented to and could potentially cost a state sub­
stantial political capital, economic resources or both. As for poorer nations, 
the lack of language taking into account the burden imposed is likely to pro­
mote their belief that their limited financial needs are not being considered. 
Moreover, these burdens pose disproportionate negative effects on poor na­
tions. In contrast, wealthier nations are in a better position to shirk any addi­
tional obl igations imposed under the rubric of AGNRs because no clear 
enforcement mechanism or even formulation of theoretical consequences of 
breaking AGNRs exists. As to this problem of consequences, Special Rap­
porteur James Crawford noted 
It may be asked what the consequences of a breach of that obligation 
[of AGNRs] might be. For example, could a State which had tendered 
full reparation for a breach be liable for countermeasures because of its 
1 10 Third Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 86, at 26. 
1 1 1  The word "explicit" is used because it is conceivable that the ILC intended to give some 
weight to this factor in its "nature of the obligation and the breach" language. Theoretically, one 
could argue that an incredible burden makes compliance difficult, if not impossible and thus would 
make non-repetition similarly difficult-thus affecting the "nature of the obligation and breach." 
1 12 The U.S. reluctance to fully enter into many international agreements can already be traced to 
the type of domestic influence of international courts that AGNRs would tend to promote. 
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failure to give assurances and guarantees against repetition satisfactory to 
the injured State? It does not seem very likely. 1 13 
B. Historical Use 
Given the ICJ's failure to effectively explicate the characteristics of ap­
propriate use, historical use of AGNRs is important as a potential guide. Un­
fortunately, as noted above, the historical basis of court-issued AGNRs is 
difficult to ascertain. Although it is also clear that verbal assurances are in­
dispensable tools of international negotiations, there have been few clear 
documented examples. They are generally seen as being requested when 
"restoration of the pre-existing situation does not protect (the injured State) 
enough."1 14 Essentially, the AGNRs requested in historical diplomatic prac­
tice were efforts to allow the restoration of the international relationship be­
tween two states. 
There are very limited examples of the utilization of AGNRs in the legal 
arena. Among these is a case heard before the European Court of Human 
Rights, Denmark v. Turkey, in which Turkey agreed in a friendly settlement 
that its police would engage in an international program of training . 1 1 5 Simi­
larly, in the Castillo Petrua.i case before the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (IACHR), the IACHR found the government of Peru in violation of 
human rights aspects of the American Convention. 1 16 In Castillo Petruzzi, 
the defendant was convicted by a military tribunal of treason and sentenced 
to life imprisonment. 1 17 In its judgment, the IACHR denounced the use of 
"faceless" military tribunals as a violation of the American Convention. 
Such tribunals were violations of an impartial trial guaranteed under Article 
8. 1 of the American Convention because the very arm of the government 
charged with combating terrorism was used in assessing its detainees '  guilt 
or innocence.ns Further, Peru was found in violation of other portions of the 
American convention in its treatment of the prisoners prior to their trial . 1 1 9  In 
its finding that the nation's actions were violations, the IACHR affirmed ear-
1 13 Third Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 86, at 26 para. 58. 
1 14 Id. at 162. 
m See Denmark v. Turkey, 2000-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 8-1 0  para. 21 (2000). 
1l6 Castillo Petruzzi et al., Case 52, Inter-Am. C.H.R. para. 93, ser. C (1999). Additional charges 
of violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations were originally brought but either 
dismissed as moot or disposed of in preliminary objections, id. , and thus, not dealt with thoroughly 
in the final judgment. 
117 Id. para. l .  
1 18 Id. para. 125 & 130. 
1 19 Examples of the other violations of the treaty were Article 5 (conditions of confinement) and 
Article 7.5 (30 day detention without judicial hearing insufficiently prompt). 
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lier case law declaring that Peru needed "to adopt such measures as may be 
necessary to ensure that violations such as those established in the instance 
case never again occur in its jurisdiction."120 While not going into specific 
details as to the "necessary" measures, the Court followed its declaration in 
relation to the American Convention stating that Peru, "is to adopt the appro­
priate measures to amend those laws and ensure the enjoyment of the rights 
recognized in the Convention to all persons within its jurisdiction, without 
exception." 12 1 At the very least this would require the domestic reform of 
some of its anti-terrorism legislation that authorizes the kind of military 
tribunals utilized in Castillo Petruzzi. Conceivably, it would also involve 
substantial overhaul of legal procedures and aspects of the prison system that 
were also deemed violations. In response to the judgment by the IACHR, 
Peru made known its intention to immediately withdraw from the jurisdiction 
of the IACHR. 122 Apparently this was an attempt to avoid prospective judg­
ments against the state and avoid any legal reform implicated by the Court's 
ruling. 123 The Court held that Peru's  withdrawal was ineffective and that the 
IACHR would continue to rule on cases brought against it. The Court ruled 
that the only way to avoid jurisdiction by the Court was to withdraw from the 
entirety of the American Convention or at the very least give substantial no­
tice before withdrawal would take effecr. 124 
There is at least one overriding lesson in the application of AGNRs that 
can be derived from cases such as Trail Smelter and Castillo Petruzzi-that 
the assessment of the burden should be a clear factor in determining whether 
AGNRs should be applied. In Castillo Petruzzi , the IACHR was undoubt­
edly correct in its assessment that the actions of the Peruvian government 
went beyond the limits intended by the American Convention. Unfortu­
nately, the remedy of the Court requiring reformation of all laws that could 
lead to the repetition of the violation was both breathtakingly broad and inva­
sive. This may not have been the sole factor affecting Peru' s  decision to 
withdraw from the Court's jurisdiction (and potentially the American Con­
vention), but it was certainly an aggravating factor. In order to faithfully 
comply with the Court's order, the Peruvian government would have been 
forced to begin a substantial change of its laws and compromise what it 
viewed as a noble effort to eradicate terrorist threats to both the government 
and its people. 
1 2° Castillo Petruzzi et al., Case 52, Inter-Am. C.H.R. para. 93, ser. C ( 1999). 
1 2 1  Id. 
1 22 Douglass Cassell, Peru Withdraws from the Court: Will the Inter-American Human Rights 
System Meet the Challenge?, 20 HuM. RTS. L.J. 167, 168-69 ( 1999). 
1 23 fd. at 1 68 n. 10. 
124 fvcher Bronstein , Case 54, Inter-Am. C.H.R. para. 40, ser. C (1 999). 
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The Trail Smelter case involved a more limited and specific set of 
AGNRs that dealt with an important, but not security-driven, issue. The bur­
den of requiring a company to compile statistics and share them with both the 
Canadian and U.S.  governments may involve a somewhat untraditional in­
fringement on a nation's  conception of sovereignty, but is unlikely to create 
substantial costs to the government in either financial resources or political 
capital. Compared to the IACHR' s  action, it is much more subtle and less 
invasive, and can be ascribed to the goal of maintaining a legal relationship. 
The Trail Smelter remedy was also easier to comprehend, enact, and accept 
because it dealt with a much more tangible problem that was fairly easily 
addressed. The problem was the amount of contamination produced by one 
actor, thus, only one major actor necessarily was involved in remedying the 
problem. The legal problem created by the Trail Smelter AGNR might have 
been in it being too specific, and thus not leaving the method of compliance 
to the violating government. This aspect of it was likely remedied by the fact 
that it was a relatively minor infringement into sovereignty . 125 In contrast, 
the Castillo Petruzzi order that all actions should be taken to avoid violation 
in the future would require an overhaul of national security measures .  
Ultimately, the codification effort appears to have ceded the idea o f  pro­
viding any guiding language as to when the use of AGNRs would be "appro­
priate," leaving international judicial bodies free to find situations where 
"circumstances so require" AGNR implementation. This was made clear by 
Crawford's  note that "there must be serious doubt as to whether any form of 
words could give much guidance in advance of the assurances or guarantees 
appropriate in any given case."126 
In LaGrand, the ICJ never addresses these difficult issues of applica­
tion. The court does not specify the content of the duty or its implications 
within the confines of the LaGrand case, or beyond. 127 The result is indeter­
minacy for states, lessened respect for the principle of AGNRs the Court is 
attempting to establish, and heightened concerns over the Court 's  legitimate 
purpose and confidence in its judgment as a whole. 
125 Relatively minor requirements like those levied in Trail Smelter are exactly the type of small 
"chipping away" actions that international institutions de facto are able to exercise to advance their 
goals. The cost of fighting such a minor infringement largely exceeds the costs of acquiescing. 
126 Third Special Rap porteur Report, supra note 86, at 26 para. 59. 
127 See Christian J. Tams, Recognizing Guarantees and Assurances of Non-Repetition: LaGrand 
and the Law of State Responsibility, 27 YALE J. lNT'L L. 441, 442 (2002). 
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C. Illegitimacy as Hindrance to Development of AGNRs and as Taint to 
International Institutions 
The result of the ICJ' s doctrinal aggrandizement of AGNRs is two-fold. 
First, specifically relating to their embrace as a remedy of the future, AGNRs 
could serve as a powerful weapon in directly influencing specific state prac­
tices within domestic law. Secondly, the illegitimacy of this new weapon, 
created by of judicial activism, could just as easily indicate a greater sphere 
of power acquired by the ICJ as erode the foundation of consent by nations 
and undermining the Court' s current power. 
The impact of the La.Grand decision on international remedies specifi­
cally, and international law generally, will ultimately be determined by its 
efficacy in making international law more powerful and responsive to chang­
ing needs. As described earlier, the perceived benefit of the adoption of 
AGNRs is to "modify the traditional idea that the rules of state responsibility 
are mainly concerned with the reparation of wrongs between injured and re­
sponsible state, and the restoration of the status quo ante ."128 AGNRs re­
present the ICJ's willingness to enter into a forward-looking approach to 
future compliance with international law. In assessing whether such compli­
ance will follow, it becomes necessary to undertake an examination of why 
nations comply with international law. 
1. Theories of Compliance in International Law 
Numerous theories attempt to explain why states comply with interna­
tional law.129 The compliance question haunts all areas of international law 
because its resolution affects the framework of law to maximize efficiency 
and predictability. Among the theories, Louis Henkin, Thomas Franck, and 
Harold Hongju Koh, have provided the paradigms most generally adhered to 
relative to this important question. Henkin's  assertion that "almost all na­
tions observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their 
obligations almost all of the time" 130 sets the background for an assessment 
of why some principles are not respected and what their non-compliance 
means. 
Henkin declared that compliance resulted from a cost/benefit analysis 
that consistently favored international legal compliance. Decisions of non­
compliance could either be traced to an unusual non-rational act or a clear, 
128 Tams. supra note 36, at 22. 
1 29 See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L. J. 2599 
( 1997) (an intensive study relating to the development of legal theory surrounding international 
legal compliance tracing this development from classical times to present). 
130 Lorns HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979). 
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important advantage perceived by the nation in breaching its international 
obligation. 131 The potential advantage assessed based on an examination of 
numerous factors relating to the effects of compliance in both foreign affairs 
and domestic policy . 1 32 While not explicitly tying this cost/benefit analysis to 
legitimacy, some of the Henkin factors are substantially related to the legiti­
macy of the international obligation in question. The factor of a nation's 
desire to possess a reputation for principled behavior 133 is directly affected 
by the obligation's legitimacy. Should the obligation be widely considered 
as illegitimately created, noncompliance is unlikely to engender scorn from 
other nations. Additionally, this reasoning mirrors the factors used in assess­
ing whether there has been "internal acceptance."134 
Thomas Franck expounded on the Henkin puzzle of international com­
pliance absent effective enforcement in The Power of Legitimacy Among Na­
tions . 135 Franck tied Henkin's observation of dependence on voluntary 
compliance and deliberative creation of international institutions and norms 
to the value of legitimacy within the institution that caused compliance. 
Franck defined legitimacy as "a property of a rule or rule-making institution 
which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively 
because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into 
being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right 
process." 1 36 The very nature of international law as a voluntary system re­
quires a high of  institutional and procedural legitimacy. In assessing a rule's 
legitimacy, and thus its compliance-inducing power, Franck identified four 
major factors: determinacy, validation and creation by appropriate processes, 
conceptual coherence, and conformity with the organized hierarchy of the 
rule system.137 Franck argued that international obligations and rules were 
respected because nations "perceive the rule and its institutional penumbra to 
have a high degree of legitimacy." 138 Should rule or institutional legitimacy 
decrease, voluntary compliance would suffer in correlation. The results are 
"black holes i n  the normative fabric [of international law] . . . due to a lack of 
legitimacy of the rules and institutional processes by which they are made, 
131 Id. at 49. 
132 Id. at 49-53, 60-68. 
133 Id. at 50-52. 
134 Id. at 60-68 (demonstrated by delineation of habit imitation and governmental structures 
within compliance). Henkin's internal acceptance factor is a precursor to recent work by Koh out­
lined within. 
135 THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS ( 1 990). 
136 Id. at 24. 
137 Id. ; see also Koh, supra note 129, at 2628. 
138 FRANCK, supra note 135,  at 25. 
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interpreted and applied."139 Just as a black hole digests all light and matter 
that venture too close, many other rules and institutions suffer from the taint 
of illegitimacy emanating from another area of the law. 
Koh builds on the work of Franck and others to add an additional ele­
ment in explaining compliance, that of "norm internalization" through trans­
national process. 140 Koh argues that the external creation of the international 
principle is important, as argued by Franck, but what cements state obedience 
is the internalization of that norm in the domestic realm. This internalization 
results from a "transnational process" of debate and adoption within the do­
mestic sphere affirming the nation' s  commitment to international law within 
a domestic plane. 141 Interaction within national institutions results in the in­
doctrination of international legal principles within the domestic legal struc­
ture. This indoctrination brings to life domestic legal compliance into line 
with overall legal compliance. 
2. The Taint of International Rules and Institutional Legitimacy 
Resulting from LaGrand 
The ILC and ICJ embrace of AGNRs is vulnerable to charges of illegiti­
macy due to the violation of appropriate process and aggrandizement of their 
institutional competencies. The result of this illegitimate adoption will be a 
weaker World Court and lessened respect for international legal principles­
beginning with AGNRs and emanating into the larger atmosphere of interna­
tional law. Rigorous analysis, inducing certainty and predictability is instru­
mental to reinforcing the veneer of legitimacy of institutions that are largely 
dependent on voluntary compliance.142 One commentator noted that thor­
ough legal analysis by international courts, "may . . . be necessary to the 
l 39 Thomas M. Franck, Why a Quest for Legitimacy?,  21 U.C. DA vis L. REv. 535, 546 ( 1 988). 
1 40 Koh, supra note 129, at 2646. 
14 1  Id. at 2646-48. Koh uses the example of the unilateral change of interpretation of the ABM 
treaty by the Reagan administration which was ultimately repudiated by Clinton Administration 
policy. Id. This example may be weak given the recent Bush Administration nullification of the 
treaty, but the principle, still holds true. The ABM treaty was ultimately rejected by the Bush 
administration, in part, precisely because its tenets ultimately were not internalized sufficiently. 
1 42 See ABRAM CHAVES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEw SOVEREIGNTY 1 1 8-23 (1995) 
(arguing through the paradigm of international relations theory that evidence of international inter­
action and validity of legal norms is coordinated through legitimacy). This concern is heightened in 
international law where culture variation makes unanimity difficult and concerns over cultural im­
perialism is prevalent. In such circumstances, the fulfillment of democratic principles of participa­
tion and fair process facilitate perception of the imposed norm as just and valid and avoids state 
circumvention. J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L.  
449, 518  (2000). 
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continued acceptability of the Court and the effectiveness of its 
judgments." 143 
Legitimacy concerns are particularly heightened in legal analysis over 
the content of customary international law such as in the La,Grand adoption 
of AGNRs. The theory of customary international law has consistently been 
questioned regarding its methodology and legitimacy. 144 Despite this reality, 
the ICJ provides almost no legal analysis as to how its dramatic shift to a 
forward-looking remedial structure is based in law. Even proponents of the 
doctrinal shift find it "surprising that the court apparently did not feel the 
need to elaborate in detail why guarantees and assurances were due, or 
whether it was competent to award them."145 This absence of legal justifica­
tion came despite "the paucity of previous state practice supporting such 
claims for guarantees and assurances [AGNRs]."146 Instead of providing le­
gal analysis regarding the background of its adoption of AGNRs, the ICJ 
created a clear conceptual endorsement of AGNRs to avoid future breach of 
international law. 
The Court's judgment fails Franck's framework of legitimacy-inducing 
compliance. 147 The Court, while conceptually embracing a new remedial par­
adigm, does not set clear guidelines for its application beyond Vienna Con­
vention cases specifically dealing with the death penalty. 1 48 Similar 
circumstances are likely to be particularly rare. However, as the holding de­
pends largely on the ILC work in the area of state responsibility, potential 
application beyond wGrand's limited circumstances is certain. Similarly, as 
the decision is based in customary international law rather than treaty law, 
potential application of AGNRs is breathtakingly broad. This broadness of 
its application precludes legal certainty. The resulting indeterminacy makes 
it difficult for states to avoid subjecting themselves to this new ICJ power. 
Unwittingly being forced to endure such a new remedial structure without 
foreseeable standards for application further erodes the respect states will 
give to the rule. 
143 Jonathan J. Charney, Book Note, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 458, 460 ( 1 995) (reviewing CHRJSTOPHER 
R. Rossr, EQUITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAw: A LEGAL REALIST APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL 
DECISIONMAKING ( 1993)). 
144 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4; see generally 1. Patrick Kelly, supra note 142 (re-
garding broader legitimacy concerns). 
r45 Tams, supra note 127, at 443. 
146 Id. 
147 The factors, as identified above are determinacy; validation and creation through appropriate 
process; and conformity within organized hierarchy. 
148 See Tams, supra note 127, at 442 (recognizing vagueness in ICJ statement of means to satisfy 
the German request for assurances). 
Changing the Premise of International Legal Remedies 299 
Moreover, the interdependent reasoning of the ICJ and ILC circumvents 
the appropriate processes of both institutions, thus compromising the institu­
tional legitimacy of both organizations and bastardizing the legal norm cre­
ated. The ILC was created to codify and develop international law; the 
necessary mixing of these goals cannot, however, justify muddying legal 
principles that are clearly unsupported by traditional sources of law with es­
tablished norms. By waiting for the ICJ to rule in LaGrand, the ILC was 
waiting for additional foundation to base its expansion of remedies in the law 
of state responsibility. The ICJ' s willingness to artificially bolster the ILC 
position, while itself clearly relying on that institution' s  legitimacy and work 
takes the Court beyond appropriate processes and serves to validate any sus­
picion that it was not empowered on its own to find such a remedy within 
established law. The fact that the ICJ altered the borders of its powers so 
substantially without providing sound legal justification heightens skepticism 
surrounding the LaGrand decision, as well as towards the inevitable judg­
ments in the future which will require a high degree of legitimacy in both the 
legal rule applied and in the institution applying it in order to ensure 
compliance. 
The court also ignores Koh' s  additional component-inducing compli­
ance device, "norm internalization" through transnational legal process. 
Under the Koh framework, the internalization of legal norms facilitated by an 
established process by which international institutions and domestic institu­
tions interact is key to compliance. The ICJ attempts to recast the ILC codi­
fication process into a facade of sufficient input and ultimate transnational 
adoption of AGNRs into established law. Under the transnational process 
theory, AGNRs could become an acceptable international legal rule if their 
adoption followed the traditional path that had begun with their consideration 
by the ILC. They would have been considered, rejected or accepted as po­
tential progressive development of international law by the commission and 
then sent on for further elaboration and debate amongst states. States would 
begin to further outline the proper boundaries by which such remedies would 
operate and encourage adoption not only within international institutions, but 
within the domestic legal sphere as well. After such consideration, they 
would eventually begin to display some of the characteristics ·of customary 
international law and ultimately, be ripe for further recognition by the ICJ. 
The fact that such deliberate decision making and adoption did not take place 
means that the rule of forward-looking remedial structures such as AGNRs 
have been unnaturally and undemocratically made part of international law. 
Such unnatural occurrences are rarely respected as legitimate exercises of 
law and power. 
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The repercussions of ICJ legitimacy do not extend only vertically 
amongst international and national institutions, but also horizontally amongst 
international groups. The ICJ, in addition to voluntary compliance, depends 
at least formally on the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly 
for enforcement. Legitimacy issues raised by artificial elevation of legal 
norms by the ICJ further complicate practical obstacles of enforcement by 
these branches. A nation like the United States, upon receiving an unfavora­
ble judgment could, with justification, couch non-compliance with a ques­
tionable rule in legitimacy terms and further might can graft its concerns of 
legitimacy into non-compliance with more accepted legal norms. 1 49 These 
compliance-circumventing justifications ultimately can be transferred domes­
tically, resulting in reverse norm internalization. Such domestic skirting of 
international laws indoctrinated into domestic systems cannot easily be con­
tained to one area of law, but rather, is harmful to the entire international 
system. 
Legitimacy concerns go beyond institutional taint to include the contam­
ination of the legal rule. AGNRs, legitimate in themselves, may suffer even 
if legitimately adopted by other international organizations. Suspicion of the 
inadequacy of past adoption could easily transfer to suspicion of current 
processes of adoption by regional governance structures like the European 
Union. One reason behind this phenomenon is that illegitimate adoption 
often signals unfairness in rule application. If it is considered necessary to 
bypass normal processes that benefit compliance principles, parties often be­
lieve that someone may be unfairly benefiting, even if this is not the case. 150 
CONCLUSION 
In this article I have demonstrated how the ILC in its Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility and the ICJ in La,Grand attempt to bypass customary 
international law by relying on the authority of each other. The ILC work on 
Article 30 was designed to move away from state consent and domestic re­
sponsibility in tailoring international obligations. Faced with the reality that 
AGNRs lack both consistent state practice and opinio juris, but unwilling to 
label them as progressive development, the ILC waited for ICJ adoption of 
149 The latter justification is less persuasive, but is demonstrative of how the taint of illegitimacy 
can go beyond a specific legal norm or principle into a broader concern of institutional legitimacy. 
150 An example of this phenomenon is U.S. force in Kosovo. In that situation, the U.S. redefined 
traditional rationalization for use of force after force had begun. Such hindsight justifications made 
weaker states suspicious that the U.S. was looking for application beyond its Kosovo military opera· 
tions. See Michael J. Glennon, Book Review: Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Intervention­
ism After Kosovo, 96 AM. J. lm-'L. L. 489, 492 (2002). 
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such measures in LaGrand. The ICJ did so while declining to exercise the 
large scope of this new remedy, which kept the focus of the case on the death 
penalty and provisional measures. 
The ICJ's and ILC's surreptitious movement toward AGNRs resulted in 
an illegitimate and artificial production of an international rule, which is both 
bad public policy and which stains both the institutions and the principle. A 
change in international law to a future-oriented approach empowered to in­
terfere directly with domestic law redefines international court power under 
the doubtful guise of custom. The effect of the policy, poor resource alloca­
tion decided from afar with no legal basis, poor enforcement, and lack of 
determinative guidelines is harmful. Even more concerning is the ripple ef­
fect that such wide leaps of judicial activism, made possible by questionable 
process, will have on international institutions and their relationships with 
each other and domestic governance. 
